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RULE 15(c) MISTAKE: THE SUPREME COURT IN 
 
KRUPSKI SEEKS TO RESOLVE AJUDICIAL THICKET 
 
Robert A. Lusardi" 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The statute of limitations is a device that protects potential defendants 
from being subjected to suit on stale claims.l It is based on the idea that 
defendants should be free from the risk of litigation after the passage of an 
arbitrary amount of time, so that they may order their affairs without 
concern that they will be notified of a suit when information and documents 
that are needed to defend the matter are no longer available. While 
recognizing the importance of a statute of limitations, Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 15 acts as a counterbalance to such statutes by allowing a 
plaintiff to freely amend a complaint to assert additional claims, or to name 
new or additional parties, and have those amendments relate back to a 
complaint filed within the statute oflimitations even though that statute has 
run.2 The intent of the rule is to encourage decisions on the merits by 
liberally allowing changes to pleadings and having those changes relate back 
to a timely filed complaint if certain conditions are met.3 
• Professor of Law, Western New England College School of Law; AB., Colgate University, 1968;J.D., 
Boston College, 1971. I would like to thank Michelle L Himes WiedeIOchall for her invaluable research 
assistance with this Article. 
I Paul D. Carrington, "Suhstona" and ''Procedure'' in the Rules &whlingAct, 1989 DUKE LJ. 281, 290. 
2 For purposes of this Article, references will be to the current version of the rule, FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c)(I), 
which reflects the 2007 style amendments but makes no substantive change. It provides: 
(I) When an Amendment Relates Back. An amendment to a pleading relates back to the date of the 
original pleading when: 
(A) the law that provides the applicable statute oflimitations allows relation back; 
(B) the amendment asserts a claim or defense that arose out of the conduct, transaction, or 
occurrence set out-or attempted to be set out-in the original pleading; or 
(C) the amendment changes the party or the naming ofthe party against whom a claim is asserted, 
ifRule 15(c)(I)(B) is satisfied and if, within the period provided by Rule 4{m) for serving the summons 
and complaint, the party to be brought in by amendment: 
(i) received such notice of the action that it will not be prejudiced in defending on the merits; 
and 
(Ii) knew or should have known that the action would have been brought against it, but for a 
mistake concerning the proper party's identity. 
FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c)(I). 
3 &, Canington, supra note I, at 310-12. 
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There have been interpretive problems, particularly with the language 
of Rule 15 (c)(1)(C)(ii).4 These problems arise when the "amendment 
changes the party or the naming of the party" after the statutory period and 
the conditions of Rule 15(c)(1)(C) are applied.5 Courts have often been very 
cautious in interpreting the rule because of a reluctance to see a person 
drawn into litigation after the statute oflimitations has run out.6 The text of 
the rule addresses this problem by allowing such relation back only when 
the claim is sufficiently related to the original pleading and the defendant 
"received such notice of the action so that it [would] not be prejudiced in 
defending on the meritsD and knew or should have known that the action 
would have been brought against it, but for a mistake concerning the proper 
party's identity."7 This Article will focus on the phrase "knew or should 
have known ... but for a mistake concerning the proper party's identity," as 
set out in Rule 15(c)(1)(C)(ii). Particularly, how differing interpretations of 
that phrase by courts of appeals have affected the application of the rule in 
four related but somewhat different situations, which has led to the 
Supreme Court taking up the issue. 
First, courts are in general agreement that the "mistake" language is 
met when a change is made to correct a misnomer or misidentification in 
which the plaintiff has asserted a claim against the correct defendant, but 
has misspelled or misnamed that defendant.8 A second situation that has 
been more problematic occurs when a plaintiff sues the wrong party and 
wants to substitute or add a new defendant who the plaintiff was unaware of 
when it filed suit. Here, some courts, relying on 
misnomer/misidentification as an absolute limitation on the rule, assert that 
there was no mistake on the plaintiffs part and so deny relation back.9 
These courts assert that the plaintiff had not made a mistake "concerning 
the proper party's identity"l0 because the plaintiff sued the intended party 
and only lacked knowledge of the proper party. I I The third situation arises 
when a plaintiff knows of the existence of the potential party, but does not 
sue him because the plaintiff does not know that the person is potentially 
• ~ e.g., Harold S. Lewis,Jr., The &esiJ;e HISIory qfFederal Ruk J5(c) and Its lessrmsfor Cwil Rults RsJision, 85 
MICH. L. REv. 1507 (1987). 
5 FED. R CIY. P.l5(c)(IXC). 
6~ eg., Rendall-Speranza v. Nassim, 107 F.3d 913 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 
7 FED. R. CIV. P.15(c)(1)(C)(i)-{ii); see uyra text accompanying notes I (}-II. The ptupOse of this provision is 
to protect the defendant's due process rights. See 6A CHARLEs ALAN WRiGHf IT AL., FEDERAL PRAcTICE AND 
PROCEDURE§ 1498 (3ded. 2010). 
8~ e.g., Robertsv. Michaels, 219 F.3d 775, 777-78 (8th Cir. 2(00). 
9 ~ e.g., Wilson v. United States Gov't, 23 F.3d 559 (1st Cir. 1994). 
IOFED.RCIY.P.15(c)(I)(C)(ri). 
II See Wllron, 23 F.3d at 563. 
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liable, or because the plaintiff makes a strategic choice not to sue the 
person. 12 If the plaintiff decides to sue that person after the statute of 
limitations has run out, it once again raises the "mistake" versus lack-of­
knowledge arguments of the misnomer advocates since the plaintiff 
originally sued the intended party.13 The final situation deals with 
placeholder defendants, so called 'john Does," and whether an amendment 
changing a 'john Doe" to a named defendant can relate back. 14 Once 
again it is argued that there is no mistake under the rule since the plaintiff is 
acknowledging that he has not made a mistake, but instead simply does not 
know who the defendant or defendants are. 15 
This Article will begin by examining the text and purpose of the rule. It 
will then analyze the cases that show the competing views as to the meaning 
of Rule 15(c)(1)(C)(ii) and evaluate these views in light of the U.S. Supreme 
Court's recent decision in Krnpski v. Costa Crociere S.p.A.,16 in which the Court 
sought "to resolve tension among the Circuits over the breadth of Rule 
15(c)(1)(C)(ii)."17 
II. PuRPOSE OF THE RULE 
In the words of Professor Kaplan, "[a] rule ofprocedure has a sphere of 
influence beyond its precise text, but how far it should extend is a matter of 
taste."18 To judge the meaning of the "mistake" language of Rule 15 
requires an examination of the text of the rule, the Advisory Committee's 
notes on its adoption, and a review of the judicial interpretations of that 
seemingly simple term to judge what its application should be. 
The provision dealing with changing parties that includes the "mistake" 
language was added to Rule 15(c) in 1966.19 The Advisory Committee's 
purpose was to expand on the original rule, which only provided that an 
amendment could relate back to the date of the original pleading if it "arose 
out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be 
set forth in the original pleading."20 While that language clearly addressed 
12 ~ e.g., Randall-Speranza v. Nassim, 107 F.3d 913, 918 (D.C. Gir. 1997). 
13&eid. 
1-1 ~ e.g., Worthington v. Wilson, 8 F.3d 1253, 1257 (7th Gir. 1993). 
15&eid. 
16 Krupski v. Costa Crociere S.pA, 130 S. Ct 2485 (2010). 
17Id at 2492. 
18 Benjamin Kaplan, Omtinuing Wod: o/"the (]oil 0nnmiJtee: 1966Amtntbntntr o/"the Ftxleral Rulrs o/"Gvil Proctdu.re 
(/), 81 HARv. L. REv. 356, 410(1967). 
19 FED. R. CIv. P. 15 advisoIY committee's note to 1966 amendment 
20 FED. R. CIv. P. 15(c) (1957) (amended 1966); SEe FED. R. CIv. P. 15 advisoIY committee's note to 1966 
amendment 
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questions of relation back for additional claims involving the same parties, it 
did not make clear whether it would apply to situations where new parties 
were added or the parties were changed. Some courts had read this 
language broadly to permit amendments to relate back that changed the 
party or the name of the party.21 The Advisory Committee addressed this 
issue because it was particularly concerned with cases against the federal 
government in which the wrong defendant was named because the plaintiff 
used names ofparties who did not exist, could not be properly sued, or who 
had retired.22 In these cases, some courts had refused to permit relation 
back of the amendments by parties that were made upon "[d]iscovering 
their mistakes" on the grounds that these amendments would constitute the 
"commencement of a new proceeding," and so could not relate back to the 
original fIling.23 
In criticizing the "new proceeding" approach, the Advisory Committee 
emphasized that it was not consistent with the intent of the rule and that the 
revisions to the rule were intended to clarity thiS.24 The question was not 
whether the amendment created a "new proceeding," but whether the 
policy of the statute ofiimitations was satisfied.25 That policy, the Advisory 
Committee asserted, turned on whether the defendant had received 
adequate notice of the action. 26 
The Advisory Committee's note does not focus on the term "mistake" 
and does not treat it as an integral part of the rule. Instead it appears to use 
"mistake" as a short hand for the type of problems that lead to the need for 
relation back. The note initially states that the purpose of the amendment 
to the rule is to state "more clearly when an amendment of a pleading 
changing the party against whom it is asserted (including an amendment to 
correct a misnomer or misdescription of a defendant) shall 'relate back' to 
the date of the original pleading. "27 In doing so, the Advisory Committee 
makes clear its intent to deal with problems beyond basic errors of 
misnomer and misdescription, thus opening up the rule's coverage to a 
21 &.; e.g., Martz v. Miller Bros. Co., 244 F. Supp. 246, 249 (D. Del. 1965). 
22 &, FED. R. CIv. P. 15 advisory committee's note to 1966 amendment ("[f]he claimants instituted timely 
action but mistakenly named as defendant the United States, the Department of HEW, the 'Federal Security 




26 Id.; see also Carrington, JUflra note I, at 311-12 ('''The 1966 addition ... was intended to seIVe the general 
pwpose of liberalizing the availability of relation back for plaintiJIS who timely commenced suits against the 
wrong defendants and whose mistakes were known to the intended defendants."). 
27 FED. R CIv. P. 15 advisory committee's note to1 966 amendment 
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number of additional situations without specifYing what those situations are. 
The note does refer to "mistakenly named defendants" and "[d]iscovering 
their mistakes, "28 but uses the mistake language as a generic way to describe 
the specific examples of suing the federal government that were the 
precipitating cause for the amendment. More importandy, the note goes on 
to emphasize that the key to the amendment is the connection between 
relation back and the policy of the statute of limitations.29 That policy, the 
Advisory Committee explains, is based on whether the party was "put on 
notice of the claim within the stated period. "30 If the party has received that 
notice, it would be "merely question-begging; and to deny relation back is to 
defeat unjusdy the claimant's opportunity to prove his case."31 Thus, the 
key to relation back for the Advisory Committee was whether the defendant 
has received notice, not whether the claimant lacked knowledge or 
committed an error at the time he fIled the original claim.32 There is no 
recognition of a special "mistake" component in the Advisory Committee's 
note, and it appears that the term is intended to create a short-hand phrase 
to describe how the claimant has put himself into the situation requiring 
relation back. 
This reading of the Advisory Committee's intention is reinforced by its 
citation to Professor Byse's article as a source for a fuller discussion of the 
underlying purpose in amending Rule 15.33 In his article, Professor Byse 
states that the goal of a procedural system is to balance the rigidity 
necessary to have a workable system with the need to do substantial 
justice.34 He points out that in striking this balance in the relation back 
area, the question should be whether the purpose of the statute of 
limitations is thwarted by permitting the relation back of the amendment.35 
Since the purpose of the statute of limitations is to give the defendant timely 
notice of the claim, the amendment should relate back if the defendant has 
received such notice since it would be just to adjudicate the plaintifPs 
claim.36 Nowhere does he suggest any relevance to what caused the plaintiff 









32 See id. (citing Dark Byse, Suing the ''W7lJ1!g'' Dgindant in Judicio1 RI'1Iitw ofFttferal Administrative Minn: Proposal 
 
.forJl4imn, 77 HARv. L REv. 40 (1963)). 
33 See FED. R. CN. P. 15 advisol)' committee's note to 1966 amendment. 
:u Byse, supra note 32, at 45-46. 
35 Id. While Professor Byse speaks of the specific sixty-day requirement to sue after an adverse decision 
under the Social Security Act, the reasoning applies to all statute oflimitations cases. 
3IlSeeid. at 46. 
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the reason for the plaintifPs failure to sue the correct defendant IS not 
relevant to the inquiry. 
While it is clear that the Advisory Committee did not focus on the word 
"mistake," and its use as a limiting condition, in the underlying reasoning 
that justifies relation back of amendments, a majority of the United States 
circuit courts that have considered the issue have focused on "mistake" as a 
significant limiting requirement on the use of relation back. 37 The next 
section will consider how courts have analyzed the mistake component in 
relation back and the source of their reasoning. 
III.JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS OF MISTAKE 
A. Origin 
The judicial development of the meaning of the "mistake" component 
of Rule 15(c) originates in the Seventh Circuit Court ofAppeals' decision in 
Wood v. Worachek. 38 While that case is almost always cited as the source for 
the restrictive reading of "mistake" as not including a lack ofk.Tlow!edge, the 
decision provides little reasoning or authority for that proposition. The case 
involved a claim against named and unnamed law enforcement officers who 
were denominated 'John Doe and Richard Roe."39 When the named 
defendants were successful on motions for summary judgment, the plaintiff 
amended the complaint to change the names ofJohn Doe and Richard Roe 
to specific law enforcement officers.40 The district court then dismissed the 
claims against the new defendants since the statute of limitations had 
expired before they were made parties to the action.41 In response to the 
plaintiffs contention on appeal that his amendment should relate back to 
within the statute of limitations, the court of appeals asserted that the 
amendment did not meet any of the conditions of the rule, but in particular 
the court spoke to the "mistake" requirement. It concluded that the 
requirement was not met "where ... there is a lack of knowledge of the 
proper party."42 The court's basis for this view was that the rule was 
designed to correct misnomers, and so relation back was only permitted 
where there was "an error made concerning the identity of the proper party 
37 See iJifTa Part ill. 
38 See Wood v. Worachek, 618 F.2d 1225,1230 (7th Cir. 1980). 
39 Id. at 1228. 
4<) Id. 
41 Id. 
42Id. at 1229--30. 
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and where that party is chargeable with knowledge of the mistake."43 Since 
the plaintiffs use ofJohn Doe and Richard Roe was not a mistake, but 
simply a lack of knowledge as to the identity of the law enforcement officers, 
he could not make use of Rule 15(c).44 The court cited another Seventh 
Circuit case, Sassi v. Breier, as authority for its distinction between mistake 
and lack of knowledge.45 That case was very similar to Wood on its facts, 
which also involved a civil-rights action in which the plaintiff amended the 
complaint to substitute the previously unknown police officers for John Doe 
and Richard Doe. The Sassi court accepted the findings of the district court 
that the new defendants did not have notice of the action, nor knowledge 
that they would have been original defendants "but for [a] mistake or even 
lack of knowledge of their identities that the newly named defendants would 
have been named as original defendants."46 Having left the question of 
mistake/lack of knowledge open, the court went on to say that naming a 
John Doe defendant did not toll the statute oflimitations "until such time as 
a named defendant may be substituted."47 Thus, the court made the point 
that aJohn Doe defendant without more is not enough to permit relation 
back because "[t]o hold otherwise could have an unwarranted impact upon 
the salutary purposes of statutes oflimitations."48 So Wood's citation of this 
case is not supportive of its position because Sassi does not address the 
mistake/lack of knowledge question, but only says that if you have not met 
the Rule 15(c) requirements of notice and knowledge, you cannot go 
through the back door by listing a John Doe and have that serve as a 
substitute. 
B. Mqjori!J Vzew 
The Wood decision has had a substantial impact on the developing 
interpretation of Rule 15(c) and represents the view of a majority of the 
courts of appeals that have considered the issue.49 In addition, the 
reasoning set out in Wood has been applied not only to John Doe cases, but 
also has been used to reach the same result in cases where the plaintiff has 
.3Id. at 1230. 
"See id. 
45Id. (citing Sassi v. Breier, 584 F.2d 234,235 (7th Cir. 1978)); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 15 advisory 
committee's note tol966 amendment. 
.0 Sassi, 584 F.2d at 235 . 
., Id. 
48 Id. 
.9 Ste Hall v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 469 F.3d 590,596-97 (7th Ur. 2006) (citing several circuit court decisions 
that are in accord with the holding in WtxXi). 
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named a defendant and wants to substitute a new defendant, or the plaintiff 
seeks to add a defendant or defendants to the action.50 
An example of this extension is Hall v. Norfolk Southern Railwqy.51 In Hall, 
a railroad worker who had suffered a work-related injury fIled suit under the 
Federal Employers Liability Act (FELA) against Norfolk Southern Railway 
on the mistaken belief that Norfolk was his employer and therefore liable 
under FELA.52 When the plaintiff discovered his error and sought to 
amend his claim to name his actual employer, Conrail, after the statute of 
limitations had run, the magistrate judge refused to allow relation back on 
the view that there was no mistake since the plaintiff "made a conSCIOUS 
choice to sue Norfolk instead ofhis employer."53 
In reviewing the magistrate's decision, the Seventh Circuit rejected the 
argument that Wood's lack of knowledge rule should only apply to John Doe 
cases and not to cases where the plaintiff had named the wrong person.54 
The court found the two situations to be the same since in both cases the 
plaintiffs 
did not know who to name as defendants before the limitations periods 
expired. Whether a plaintiff names a fictitious defendant like 'John Doe" 
because he does not know who harmed him or names an actual-but 
nonliable--railroad company because he does not know which of two 
companies is responsible for his injuries, he has not made a "mistake" 
concerning "identity" within the meaning of [Rule 15(c)(l)(C)]. He simply 
lacks knowledge of the proper party to sue. It is the plaintiffs responsibility 
to determine the proper party to sue and to do so before the statute of 
limitations expires. A plaintiffs ignorance or misunderstanding about who 
is liable for his injury is not a "mistake" as to the defendant's "identity."55 
50 The word "chan~g" in the rule has been read liberally to cover both adding and dropping parties, as 
well as substituting parties. &e, e.g., Lundyv. AdamarofNJ., Inc., 34 F.3d 1173, 1192-93 & n.l3 (3d Cir. 1994); 
see also 6A WRIGIIT ET AL., supra note 7, § 1498, at 126-29. 
51 Hall, 469 F.3d 590. 
521d. at 592. The oonfusion resulted from a business transaction in which the plaintiff's employer, Conrail, 
transferred "many of its assets and liabilities" to Norfolk Southern, who "agreed to provide claims seIVices for 
Conrail such as negotiating settlements and enrolling employees in rehabilitation programs, but Conrail retained 
liability for FElA claims that arose before June I, 1999." 1d. at 592-93. The accident occurred on February 2, 
1999. Id. at 592. 
53Id. at 593--94. The motion to amend to name Conrail was the seoond motion to amend Id at 593. The 
first motion asserted that Norfolk Southern was liable as a successor in interest to Conrail, but that motion was 
never ruled on. Id. at 593 & n.2. ff that motion had been granted, Conrail might have argued that the 
subsequent motion to amend would not relate back because the plaintiffknew at the time of the first motion that 
Conrail was his employee and had made a strategic decision to purse Norfolk Southern instead ofConrail. 
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Having made this assertion, the court failed to state any reason for its 
view, other than to rely on Seventh Circuit precedent that had "coalesced 
around the narrower view of ... 'mistake' which [the court traced] back at 
least as far as Wood."56 The court cited a number of cases from different 
circuits,57 in particular Rendall-Speranza v. Nassim,58 which provides a fuller 
analysis of the reasons for the court's narrower interpretation. 
Nassim involved claims of battery and intentional infliction of emotional 
distress by an employee of the International Finance Corporation (IFC) 
against her supervisor.59 Mter the running of the statute of limitations, the 
plaintiff learned that her supervisor had acted within the scope of his duties 
in committing a battery and inflicting emotional distress.6o She moved to 
amend the complaint to include IFC as a defendant and have the 
amendment relate back.61 In light of the plaintiffs argument that she had 
not known IFC was subject to liability, the district court allowed the 
amendment and its relation back as "a mistake concerning the identity of 
the proper party."62 
In reversing the district court's decision in Nassim, the Court of Appeals 
for the District of Columbia focused on the meaning of "mistake" and 
rejected the plaintiffs argument that a mistake occurs when the plaintiff 
believes one person is liable in tort, but it turns out that another person is 
liable.63 The court rejected this argument as too broad, and it limited the 
meaning of "mistake" to misnomers.54 In doing so, the court set out its 
reasons for defining "mistake" narrowly. It looked to the purpose of the 
rule to denote the meaning of mistake. The court characterized that 
purpose as creating a mechanism to 
avoid the harsh consequences of a mistake that is neither prejudicial nor a 
surprise to the misnamed party. A potential defendant who has not been 
named in a lawsuit by the time the statute of limitations has run is entitled 
56 Id. at 597-98 (citing to precedent asserting the narrower view). 
57 S«id at 596-97. 
58 Rendall-Speranza v. Nassim, 107 F.3d 913 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 
59 Id. at 915. 
60 Id. IFC had stated in its amicus curiae brief that Nassim was acting within his duties because he was 
attempting to prevent theft by the plaintiff ofIFC's files.ld. 
61Id. 
62Id. 
63Id. at 917-18. 
64 Id. at 918. The court characterized the plaintiH's argument as claiming a mistake when the decision was 
"one onega! judgmenL" Id. 
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to repose-unless it is or should be apparent to that person that he is the 
beneficiary of a mere slip ofthe pen, as it were. 65 
The court also looked to the Advisory Committee notes to support its 
interpretation of the rule. In particular, the court focused on the language 
in the 1991 notes that made reference to "the problem of a misnamed 
defendant,"66 as well as references to "a name correcting amendment" and 
"an intended defendant" to support its view limiting the use of the rule in 
situations where a plaintiff was aware of the defendant's identity, but not of 
its potential liability for the harm.67 
The problem with the court's view is twofold. In the first part of the 
quote, the court limits persons who will not be prejudiced or surprised to 
"the misnamed party," suggesting that this is the only person who would not 
be surprised or prejudiced, but the text of the rule is not limited in such a 
way. It applies to an amendment that "changes the party," as well as those 
that change the naming of the party. The plain meaning of that language 
in the rule is that it is not limited to a "misnamed party," or "a mere slip of 
the pen," but instead includes situations where a plaintiff substitutes new 
parties or adds additional parties. The other problem with the court's view 
of the purpose of the rule is that it assumes that only a "misnamed party" 
would not be prejudiced or surprised by the relation back. New defendants 
in many cases might have sufficient notice and knowledge to avoid surprise 
and prejudice.68 More importantly, the plaintiff would have the burden of 
proof that the new defendant had received notice of the action and 
knowledge that he was the proper defendant within the time permitted by 
the rule.69 If the plaintiff failed to meet that burden, then the relation back 
would be denied.10 
65 Jd. (emphasis added). 
66 Jd. at 918 (citing FED. R CW. P. 15 advisory committee's note to 1991 amendment). The 1991 notes 
were concerned with other changes to the rule unrelated to the "mistake" language of the 1966 amendment to 
the rule. The Nassim court went on to cite Barrow v. Wethergield Police DepartmenJ for the view that the 1991 notes 
imply the need for "an error, such as a misnomer or misidentification." Jd. (citing Barrow v. Wethernfield Police 
Dep't, 66 F.3d %6, 469 (2d Cir. 1995)). Looking for more support for its result, the court went on to say that if 
the plaintiff knows the new defendant but did not sue because she did not know of his liability, then there was no 
mistake, and the new defendant did not know or should have known that it was an intended party. Jd at 918-19. 
67 See id. at 918. The court made passing reference to the 1966 notes, but only to point out the purpose of 
dealing with suits against the government Jd 
68 &!; e.g., Worthington v. Wilson, 790 F. Supp. 829, 833 (C.D. ill. 1992) (denying relation back inJohn 
Doe § 1983 action based on Seventh Circuit precedent, even though police officers admitted that they were 
aware of the action and that they were the unnamed police officers within the applicable period under the rule), 
i!lfd, 8 F.3d 1253 (7th Cir. 1993). 
69 SeeSingietaryv. Pa Dep'tofCorr., 266 F.3d 186,201 n.S (3d Cir. 1969). 
7°Jd 
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While a majority of circuit courts that have considered this question 
have relied on Wood and its progeny in applying relation back, cases in the 
Third and Fourth Circuit Courts of Appeals have raised questions about the 
proper meaning of "mistake" in the application of relation back. 
C. Alternative View 
Approximately three years before the Seventh Circuit's decision in 
Wood asserted its view of the narrow interpretation of the "mistake" 
language in Rule l5(c), the Third Circuit Court of Appeals considered the 
application of relation back in Varlack v. SWC Caribbean, Inc.7 1 Varlack was a 
placeholder case in which the plaintiff sought to amend the complaint in a 
tort action after the running of the statute of limitations to replace a 'john 
Doe" caption with the defendant's name.72 The court had no doubt that 
such an amendment constituted "changing a party," and so the amendment 
would relate back if the three conditions of the rule were met.73 The parties 
agreed that the amendment involved the same transaction as the original 
complaint, and the court was satisfied that the new party had received the 
necessary notice and knew that he was the proper party even though he was 
not named in the original complaint.74 Therefore, the court affirmed the 
district court's decision that the amendment related back.75 In doing so, the 
court made no reference to "mistake" as a separate limiting provision in 
applying the rule.76 
The Varlack decision was problematic because its timing meant that it 
did not address the issue of the meaning of "mistake" that would develop 
after Wood. That silence could even be read as not providing any authority 
for interpreting the mistake language.77 However, the Third Circuit 
returned to this question in Singletary v. Pennsywania Department qfCorrections,78 
which was also a placeholder relation back case in which the court held that 
the amendment changing the party could not relate back because the new 
71 Varlack v. SWC Caribbean, Inc., 550 F.2d 171 (3d Cir. 1977). 
72Id. at 174. 
73Id. (citing Craig v. United States, 413 F.2d 854 (9th Cir. 1969)). 
7+ Id. at 174-75. 
75Id. at 175. 
76~id. at 174-75. 
77 ~ SingietaIy v. Pa. Dep't ofOJIT., 266 F.3d 186,201 n.4 (3d Cir. 1969) ('We note, however that two 
district court cases from within this Circuit have seemingly concluded that Varlack's holding does not entail that 
amended :John Doe' complaints meet [the] 'mistake' requirement, as these cases have followed the rule ofother 
Circuits ...."). 
78 Sing/dary, 266 F.3d 186. 
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party had not received the requisite notice required by the rule.79 Having 
decided that issue, ChiefJudge Becker still proceeded to consider the issue 
of "mistake" and affirmed the view that Varlack was binding authority in the 
circuit for the proposition that a ':John Doe" complaint could relate back 
without being stymied by the mistake language.8o In doing so, he 
acknowledged that Varlack stood in opposition to the case law that 
developed in other circuits after Wood.8l However, he pointed out that the 
rule struck a balance between the interests of the parties by allowing the 
plaintiff to fIle suit and gather information through discovery so that he 
could name the proper party, while also providing fairness to the new 
defendant since the requirements of the rule took care to ensure that the 
defendant would be protected from surprise claims.82 Judge Becker 
acknowledged that the question raised "sticky issues" and asked the 
Advisory Committee to modity the rule so as to make clear its application in 
Doe cases to encourage the policies of liberal pleading and decisions based 
on the merits.83 
The Third Circuit has set out its reasoning for this alternative approach 
in allowing relation back in John Doe complaints and has applied that 
reasoning to cases that do not involve placeholder claims. In Arthur v. 
Maersk, Inc. 84 the Third Circuit considered an appeal by a merchant seaman 
who had sued in admiralty to recover damages for injuries sustained aboard 
a number of vessels.85 The plaintiff sued his employers, as owners of the 
ships, only to discover after the statute of limitations had run that the 
United States Navy was the owner of the ships, and therefore the United 
States was the sole party liable for his claims.86 The plaintiff sought leave to 
79Id at 201. 
8°Id at 2()(}--{)1 ("Varlack . .. [appeared to hold that] the amendment ofa John Doe' complaint met all of 
the conditions for Rule 15(c)(3) relation back, including the 'but tor a mistake' requirement."). 
81 Id at 201 (acknowledging that the FIrSt, Second, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits 
were contrary to Varlack). 
82Id at 201 n.5. Judge Becker noted three additional reasons for this view: (a) that particularly in civil-rights 
cases, plaintiffS are unaware of the parties who violated their rights and could only hope to detennine who is 
responsible after filing suit; (b) concerns for fuimess to new defendants are a1ready protected by the requirements 
of the rule; and (c) that there is no reason to treat these cases differently then cases involving adding or changing a 
party which also involve lack ofknowledge errors. Id 
83 Id at 201. The Advisory Committee did consider the matter, but removed it from consideration without 
action in May of 2006. & Advisory Comm. on Civil Rules, Civil Rules Suggestions Docket (H1Sfmical), UNITED 
STATF.S COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov I uscourts/RulesAndPoliciesl rules120 lO-CVDocket.pdf (last visited 
Mar. 15,2011). 
84 Arthurv. Maersk, Inc., 434 F.3d 196 (3d Cir. 2006). 
85 Id at 199-200. 
86 Id at 2()(}--{)2. In Wzlron v. Unittd States Gwemnuni, 23 F.3d 559 (1st Cir. 1994), the court considered an 
almost identical situation. The court concluded that the notice and knowledge requirements of the rule had not 
been met, but went on to cite with approval the Seventh Circuit authority and conclude that there was "no doubt 
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amend his complaint to add the United States, a request which was granted 
by the district court.87 However, that court then denied relation back, even 
though the court acknowledged that the requirements of Rule 15(c) had 
been met, because of what the district court perceived as undue delay in 
flling the amendment.88 The court of appeals rejected the district court's 
argument,89 and then went on to consider whether relation back was 
warranted, which in its view depended solely on the question ofwhether the 
amendment involved a "mistake."9o Mter first rejecting the government's 
argument that there was no mistake since the plaintiff was an experienced 
seaman and should have known that the ships were public vessels,91 the 
court raised the issue ofwhether a mistake arising from the plaintiffs lack of 
knowledge of the agency relationship between the government and the ship 
operators would satisfY the relation back rule.92 The court acknowledged 
that the majority of courts had limited relation back to "misnomer or 
misidentification," which was not the case here since the plaintiffs error was 
the result of a lack of knowledge as to the proper defendant, but found that 
of no consequence.93 In clear, unambiguous language the court asserted 
that it saw nothing in the word "mistake" that would limit it to misnomers 
and misidentifications as a definitional matter.94 More importantly, the 
difference in the cause of the error was irrelevant to the purpose of the 
relation back rule, which the court viewed as designed to protect plaintiffs 
when those "errors render the plaintiff unable to identifY the potentially 
liable party and unable to name that party in the original complaint."95 
The court reinforced this idea by making the textual argument that if the 
rule was really limited to misnomers and misidentifications, there would be 
that Rule 15(c) is not designed to remedy such mistakes." Id. at 563. 
87 Arthur, 434 F.3d at 201. 
88 Id. at 20HJ2. The Supreme Court njected undue delay as a basis for denying relation back in IGvpski. 
Krupski v. Costa Crociere S.pA, 130 S. Ct. 2485, 2496-97 (2010) ("The plaintiffs postfiling conduct is ... 
immaterial to the question whether an amended complaint relates back."). 
89Arthur, 434 F.3d at 204-06. While the district court concluded that the reqWrements ofthe rule had been 
met, it denied relation back because there had been undue delay by the plaintiff in asserting the amended 
complaint changing the party to the United States. Id. at 202. The court ofappeals concluded that undue delay 
was a reason to deny leave to amend under Rule 15(a), but was not relevant to the issue of relation back of that 
amendment Id. 204-05. Ultimately, the court decided that the delay was not sufficiently "undue" to warrant 
refusal to allow the amendment. Id. at 204-06. 
90 Id. at 207 ('The sole question is whether the United States knew or should have known that, but for a 
'mistake' ... it would have been named in the original complaint ... [I]he United States argues that ... there is 
no basis on which to find that a 'mistake' occurred."). 
91 See id. at 207--00. 
92 Id. at 208. 
93Id. 
94 See id. (citing WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1446 (1981)) (noting that mistake 
is defined as "a wrong ... statement proceeding from faulty judgment, inadequate knowledge, or inattention''). 
95Id. (citing 3JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE ~ 15.19(3][d] (3d ed. 1997)). 
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no purpose to the provision that refers to "changes the party," since it would 
not qualifY as a misnomer.96 
The reasoning in Singletary and Arthur clarified the position of the Third 
Circuit, first suggested by Varlack, but it appeared to be a lone dissent to the 
majority of courts that followed the Seventh Circuit's narrow approach to 
the issue of relation back. However, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, 
which had previously adopted the Seventh Circuit rule,97 chose to revisit 
this question, sitting en banc, in Goodman v. Praxair, Inc. 98 
In Goodman the court faced a successor-in-interest case in which the 
plaintiff had entered into a contract with a company to provide certain 
lobbying activities, and that company breached the contract by failing to 
pay money owed under the contract.99 The breaching company was then 
acquired by Praxair Services, Inc., a wholly owned subsidiary of Praxair, 
Inc. 100 The original complaint named Praxair, Inc. as the defendant, but 
when the plaintiff discovered that Praxair Services, Inc. was the entity that 
had acquired the company, he flled an amended complaint naming the 
subsidiary as an additional defendant. 101 The defendants then moved to 
dismiss the action as barred by the statute of limitations. 102 The district 
court granted the motion, concluding that the action was time barred and 
relation back did not apply. 103 
The court of appeals determined that the district court had erred in 
granting the dismissal and remanded the case to the district court to 
determine whether the statute oflimitations barred the action. 104 However, 
the majority, seeing an opportunity in this en banc setting to clarifY the 
Fourth Circuit's view, decided to consider the issue of relation back in the 
96 Id. at 209. Judge Van Antwetpen dissented primarily on the view that the plaintiJf knew that the United 
States was the proper party within the statute of limitations and so there was no mistake. Id. at 210 (Van 
Antwetpen,J., dissenting). He then turned to circuit precedent in Singfetory to argue that if the plaintiffwas really 
unsure of the proper defendant, he should have included a 'John Doe" in his original filing, thus turning a sword 
to protect plaintiffs claim into a shield for the defendant to prohibit plaintiffs claim.Jd. at 211-12. 
97 See Locklear v. Bergman & Beving AB, 457 F.3d 363, 366-68 (4th Cir. 2006). 
98 Goodman v. Praxair, Inc., 494 F.3d 458 (4th Cir. 2007). 
99 Id. at 461-62. 
100 Id. at 462-63. Goodman brought suit in state court and named Praxair, Inc. as the defendant Jd. at 461. 
Praxair removed the case to federal court and then moved to dismiss on the grounds that it was not liable under 
the contract. Jd. at 463. 
IOIId. at 461-63. 
102 Id. at 463. 
103Id. The district court concluded that the rule did not apply because the amendment did not change the 
party, but added a party; the plaintiff was aware ofthe subsidiary so it was not a mistake under the rule; and the 
plaintiff had fuiled to prove the subsidiary met the "knew or should have known . . . but for a mistake" 
requirement Id. 
104 See id. at 466. 
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event that the district court concluded on remand that the statute of 
limitations had run. I05 Unlike other cases that began by focusing on the 
meaning of the word "mistake" in Rule l5(c), the Fourth Circuit began its 
analysis by recognizing that the text of the rule sought to balance two 
competing policies. 106 On the one hand, the Advisory Committee sought to 
encourage decisions on the merits by allowing for liberal pleading and 
amendments by plaintiffs. lo7 In turn, those interests had to be weighed 
against the defendant's right to repose that is reflected in the statute of 
limitations. lOB As such, the court reasoned that the goal should be to allow 
amendments and relation back so long as "the policies of the statute of 
limitations have been effectively served."109 This approach allowed the 
court to apply the rule by focusing on whether the amendment arose from 
the same events; whether the new party, within the time period required, 
received sufficient notice of the suit so as not to be prejudiced; and whether 
he understood his connection to the litigation. llo If he did, then the new 
party had received what the statute of limitations required, and so the 
liberal amendment rules set out in Rule 15 should operate. I I I In that 
context, the term "mistake" serves little purpose since the amending party's 
state of mind is not relevant to the inquiry raised by Rule 15(c).112 It is only 
a reference for the cause of the plaintiffs amendment, and to consider it as 
having any other significance would waste judicial time parsing the 
ambiguous meaning of the term when it plays no role in deciding whether 
the plaintiff should be able to have his amendment relate back. 11 3 As the 
court concluded: 
The Rule's emphasis on notice, rather than on the type of "mistake" that 
has occurred, saves the courts not only from an unguided and therefore 
undisciplined sifting of reasons for an amendment but also from 
105Id at 466 & n.2 C'We decide the relation-back issue because the district rourt's holding on that issue is 
broader than the limitations issue and would, ifleft intact, result in an erroneous judgment if further proceedings 
revealed that the amended romplaint was filed outside ofthe limitations period. "). 
106 Id at 467. 
107Id 
108 Id at 467-68. 
109 Id at 468 (citing 3 MOORE ET AL, mpra note 95, '\115.19[3] [a]) CThe PUIpOSe ofRule 15(c) is to provide 
the opportunity for a claim to be tried on its merits, rather than being dismissed on procedrnal teclmicalities, 
when the policy of the statute oflimitations has been addressed"). 
II°Id at 470. 
III &e id. at 471 (''When that party has been given fair notice of a claim wiIhin tk IimitoJions period and mil 
suffer no improper prejudice in defending it, the liberal amendment policies of the Federal Rules favor relations­
back."). 
112 &e id. at 470. 
113&eid. (citing Arthurv. Ma=k, Inc., 434 F.3d 196,208 (3d Cir. 20(6)). The nature ofwhat caused the 
plaintiff to seek to amend may be relevant to whether the amendment should be allowed in the lim instance 
under Rule 15(a). 
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prejudicing would-be defendants who rightfully have come to rely on the 
statute oflimitations for repose. 114 
IV. KRUPSKI AND A MOVEMENT TOWARD A CONSISTENT APPLICATION 
 
OF THE RULE 
 
While using somewhat different reasoning, the Arthur and Goodman cases 
show a clear divergence by the Third and Fourth Circuits from the majority 
rule developed originally in the Seventh Circuit. Moreover, in some circuits 
that had adopted the majority rule, courts have moved away from a more 
restrictive reading of that rule,1I5 or created exceptions to its strict 
interpretation. 116 
These divergent views created an uncertainty and inconsistency in the 
application of the rule across circuits. Recognizing this, the United States 
Supreme Court recently addressed the proper interpretation of the relation 
back rule in Krupski v. Costa Crociere s.p.A. 117 
In Krupski, the plaintiff was injured aboard a cruise ship, the Costa 
Magica, and after failing to negotiate a settlement, fIled a suit against Costa 
Cruise Lines, apparently believing that Costa Cruise was the owner of the 
ship and therefore the responsible party.IIB In fact, Costa Cruise Lines was 
the sales and marketing agent for the owner, Costa Crociere S.p.A., and the 
passenger ticket named Costa Crociere S.p.A. and others as the carrier.1I9 
This confusion only became apparent to the plaintiff after the running of 
the statute of limitations, at which point she moved to amend the complaint 
to name Costa Crociere as a defendant. 12o While the district court allowed 
1I4Id at 473. 
115 O»rpare Wdson v. United States Gov't, 23 F.3d 559,563 (1st Gir. 1994) (citing Worthington v. WIlson, 8 
F.3d 1253, 1256 (7th Gir. 1993)) (stating that a lack ofknowledge as to the proper defendant was not a mistake for 
purpose ofrelation back), with Morel v. DaimlerChrysler AG, 565 F.3d 20, 22, 26-27 (1st Cir. 2009) (determining 
that the mistake requirement was met where plaintiff sought damages from the manufacturer of a vehicle and 
named DallnlerChrysler COIporation instead of the successor in interest to the manufucturer, DaimlerCluysler 
AG), and Leonard v. Pany, 219 F.3d 25,27,29-31 (1st Cir. 2000) (acknowledging that, where plaintiffsued the 
wrong defendant who he thought was the driver of the car in the accident, plaintiff's lack of knowledge was 
sufficient for the mistake language ofthe rule, and distinguishing Wzlson on the view that it involved a "mistake in 
the selection onega! theory" because plaintiff chose to sue his employers rather than the government who was the 
owner of the ships involved and the only potentially liable party). While the court sought to distinguish Wzlsvn in 
Uonard, the cases show a transition to accepting the lack of knowledge standard for mistake. 
116 .see Howard v. City of New York, No. 02-CV-1731, 2006 WL 2597857, at *4-5 (S.DN.Y. Sept. 6, 
2006) (acknowledging the Second Circuit view that lack of knowledge does not satisfy the mistake requirement, 
but citing cases that make exceptions in pro se cases). 
117 Krupski V. Costa Crociere S.pA, 130 S. Ct 2485 (2010). 
1I8Id at 2490. 
1I9Id at 2490-91. 
12°Id at 2491. 
334 UNIVERSITY OF LOUISVIllE LA W REVIEW (Vol. 49:317 
the amendment, it rejected relation back of the amendment on the view 
that there was no mistake by the plaintifII21 In the court's view, Krupski 
knew of the existence of Costa Croci ere before the statute of limitations ran 
out and simply lacked knowledge as to the correct defendant. 122 Since she 
made a conscious choice as to whom to sue, there was no mistake and 
therefore no basis for relation back. 123 The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the 
district court in a per curiam decision, citing circuit precedent that a lack of 
knowledge as to the proper defendant is not a mistake for purposes of the 
rule. 124 In doing so, the Eleventh Circuit followed the majority view as 
reflected in cases, such as Wood, Hall, and Nassim.125 The court of appeals 
focused on what the plaintiff knew or should have known within the period 
of the statute oflimitations. 126 Since Krupski knew of the existence of Costa 
Croci ere, but chose to sue Costa Cruise, she did not make a "mistake" 
under the rule because she named the party she intended to sue. 127 The fact 
that she chose the wrong company was the result of a lack of knowledge, 
which was irrelevant under a rule that the court perceived as only applying 
to misnomers and misidentifications. 128 
In reversing the Eleventh Circuit, the Supreme Court acknowledged 
that it had taken the case "to resolve tension among the Circuits over the 
breadth of Rule 15(c)(I)(C)(ii)."129 Unlike the Eleventh Circuit, which 
focused exclusively on what the plaintiff knew, the Supreme Court viewed 
the starting point as the knowledge of the new defendant, that is, whether 
the new party knew or should have known within the time period that it 
would have been named in the suit "but for an error."130 In turn, the 
plaintiffs knowledge is only relevant as it relates to the prospective 
defendant's awareness that the plaintiff made a mistake as to whom to 
121Id at 2491--92. 
 




124 Krupski v. Costa Cruise lines, N.v., llC, 330 F. App'x892, 895-96 (11th Cir. 2009), TfJ)'d,Kiupski, 130 
S. Ct.2485. 
125 &" discussion supra Part fiB. 
126 Krupski, 330 F. App'x at 894-95. 
127 &" id. at 895 ("Even the most liberal inte1pretation of 'mistake' cannot include a deliberate decision not 
to sue a party whose identity [the] plaintiffknew from the outset." (quoting Power.; v. Graff, 148 F.3d 1223, 1227 
(11th Cir. 1998)) (alteration in original)). 
128Id (,'Rule 15(c),s mistake proviso is included 'to resolve the problem ofa misnamed defendant and allow 
a party to correct a fonnal defect such as a misnomer or misidentification."' (quoting Wayne v. Jarvis, 197 F.3d 
1098, I103 (II th Gir. 1999)) (mternal quotation rnaIXs omitted)). 
129 Krupski v. Costa Crociere S.pA, 130 S. Ct. 2485, 2492 (2010). In an accompanying footnote the court 
swnmarized the circuit split. &" id. at 2493 n.2. It then concluded, "We express no view on whether these 
decisions may be reconciled with each other in light of their specific facts and the inte1pretation of Rule 
15(cXIXC)(ri)." Id 
130 Id at 2493. 
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sue. 131 The Court acknowledged that if the plaintiff had made "a deliberate 
choice to sue one party instead of another while fully understanding the 
factual and legal differences between the two parties,"132 there would be no 
mistake. Because the prospective defendant would have a reasonable 
expectation of repose,133 relation back would not be allowed. 134 But if the 
plaintiff made its choice without adequate understanding of the factual and 
legal differences between the parties, and the new defendant understood 
that, it would establish that the defendant knew it was the proper defendant 
within the prescribed time limit.135 In so stating, the Court clearly rejected 
the view of the majority of courts of appeals that there is never a mistake for 
purposes of the rule when the plaintiff makes a deliberate decision not to sue 
a prospective defendant whose identity is known to the plaintiff.I36 
The Court applied the reasoning to the facts of the case and concluded 
that relation back should have been granted. 137 Here, Costa Crociere had 
constructive notice of the lawsuit within the period, and the complaint made 
clear that the plaintiff was attempting to sue the carrier, which the plaintiff 
erroneously believed was Costa Cruise.I38 Therefore, the Court ruled that 
Costa Crociere should have known it was the proper party since it was 
apparent that the plaintiff did not have an understanding of the difference 
between Costa Cruise Lines and Costa Crociere.I39 Thus, the Supreme 
Court treated the mistake component as a mechanism to insure that the 
plaintiffs conduct was based on a lack of knowledge or understanding for 
131 Id. at 2493--94. The district court held that there was constructive notice, and that finding was not 
challenged. Id. at 2497. 
132 Id. at 2494. 
133Id. 
134 Id. at 2496 ("When the original complaint and the plaintiff's conduct compel the conclusion that the 
fuilure to name the prospective defendant in the original pleatling was the result of a fully informed decision as 
opposed to a mistake concerning the proper defendant's identity, the requirements ... are not met."). 
135Id. ("[A] deliberate but mistaken choice does not foreclose a finding that Rule 15(c)(I)(C)(ii) has been 
satisfied"). 
136 See supra text accompanying note 131. 
137 See Krupski, 130 S. Ct. at 2497. The Supreme Court also rejected the court of appeals' position that the 
relation back should be denied because the plaintiff unduly delayed filing her amended complaint, pointing out 
that the plaintiff's diligence is not a requirement for relation back. See itt. at 2496-97. 
138Id. at 2497. The district court held that Costa Crociere had constructive notice, and that finding was not 
challenged. Id. The Court fiuther supported this by pointing out that the respondent offered no explanation why 
the plaintiff would sue a party who was not legally liable for her injuries; the close relationship of the corporate 
entities should ''heighten the expectation that Costa Crociere should suspect a mistake." Jd. at 2498. 
139Id. at 2497 ("Because the complaint made clear that Krupski meant to sue the company that 'owned, 
operated, managed, supeIVised and controlled' the ship on which she was injured, and also indicated (mistakenly) 
that Costa Cruise performed those roles, Costa Crociere should have known ... that it was not named as a 
defendant ...." (citations omitted)). 
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which the defendant should not be able to take advantage of the statute of 
limitations.140 
V. APPLYING THE PROPER APPROACH IN ANALYZING RULE 15(c)(I)(C)(ii) 
Early in the Krupski opinion, Justice Sotomayor stated that the Court 
sought to "resolve [the] tension among the Circuits" over the proper 
interpretation of the relation back rule. l41 Therefore, what remains is to 
examine whether and how the Krupski analysis resolves the conflicting 
positions of the circuit courts in considering the categories of cases in which 
relation back most commonly occurs.142 
As to the first category of misnomers and misidentifications, it has 
always been agreed that the rule would allow for relation back. l43 However, 
it is also clear after Krupski that relation back is not limited to those terms. 
The Court makes clear that a mistake includes cases in which the plaintiff 
lacked knowledge as to the proper party and is not limited to "a mere slip of 
the pen," as had been asserted by a majority of the courts of appeals. l44 
While those courts have argued that this would circumvent the statute of 
limitations, the Supreme Court has clearly affirmed that a broader view of 
the rule strikes the proper balance of relation back and the statute of 
limitations. 145 Such a balance was the very intention of the Advisory 
Committee in proposing the 1966 amendments to Rule 15.146 
This is also the case in a situation in which a plaintiff knows of the 
existence of a person, but does not know that the person is potentially liable 
in the plaintiffs action. The Krupski Court makes clear that these cases meet 
the mistake requirements for relation back and, in doing so, rejects the view 
of those courts that have characterized these facts as situations in which 
there was no mistake of identity-because the plaintiff sued the intended 
party and made a conscious choice in not suing othersl47-reasoning that 
the plaintiff "knew who those parties were and made a mistake in who it 
determined it ought to sue under the circumstances."148 Here the Court 
140 .see id. at 2494 ("[R]epose would be a windfall for a prospective defendant who tmderstood, or who 
should have tmderstood, that he escaped suit during the limitations period only because the plaintiff 
misunderstood a crucial fuct about his identity."). 
141Id. at 2492. 
142 .see supra text accompanying notes 8-15. 
143 &e, e.g., Roberts v. Michaels, 219 F.3d 775 (8th Cir. 2000). 
I.. .see KrupsJri, 130 S. Ct at 2494. 
145Id. 
146.see FED. R. CIV. P. 15 advisory conunittee's note to 1966 amendment 
 
147 .see.wpra text accompanying notes 62 and 90. 
 
148 Rendall-Speranza v. Nassim, 107 F.3d 913, 918 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (quoting la-Pac. Corp. v. 
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expands the concept of mistake of identity to include those situations in 
which a plaintiff knows of a prospective defendant, but misperceives his 
status or role in the events giving rise to the claim,149 and those in which the 
plaintiff may not have known of the existence of the prospective party until 
after the statute had run. In both cases, the key question is whether the 
plaintiff had a full understanding of the facts and law in making the decision 
either not to sue a prospective defendant or to sue another defendant. If she 
did so without that full understanding, she would have made a mistake as to 
the proper party's identity, warranting relation back if the prospective 
defendant understood her mistake. 150 At the same time, the Supreme Court 
makes clear that if the plaintiff had made an affirmative decision not to sue 
a party, and subsequendy changed her mind after the statute of limitations 
had run, the plaintiff would not have made a mistake ofidentity;151 but just 
as importandy, the new defendant would have a strong argument that 
failing to sue the known potential defendant would not meet the "knew or 
should have known" component of the rule. 152 
The final situation to consider is theJohn Doe placeholder case, which 
was the factual setting for the original rejection of the "lack of knowledge" 
analysis in the Wood case. 153 While some courts have treated John Does and 
other changes of parties in the same way,154 there is a distinct difference 
with these placeholder cases. In the other situations we have considered, 
there has clearly been some error caused by some lack of understanding on 
the part of the plaintiff. InJohn Doe cases it can be argued that the plaintiff 
has not made a mistake, but is acknowledging that there is or may be 
ASARCO, Inc., 5 F.3d431,434(9th Gir. 1993)). 
149 Krupski, 130 S. Ct at 2494; sa; fog., Nassim, 107 F.3d at 9\8 (mvolving claim by plaintiff that she did not 
originally sue the new defendant because she did not think it was the liable party); SM also Wilson v. United States 
Gov't, 23 F.3d 559, 560, 563 (1st Gir. 1994) (mvolving suit where plaintiff sued his employers, believing they were 
owners of the boats where he was injured, and later learned that the United States was the owner, resulting in 
court concluding that the plaintiff "fully intended to sue GEGS, he did so, and GEGS turned out to be the 
wrong party. We have no doubt that Rule 15(c) is not designed to remedy such mistakes."). In taking this 
position the courts were viewing the rule as only applying to misnomers and misidentifications. While not being 
originally sued might be a basis for the new defendant to argue that it did not know it was a proper party to the 
action, it is not a basis to claim that the plaintiff did not make a mistake under the rule. Contra Morel v. 
DaimlerChrysler AG, 565 F.3d 20, 27 (1st Cir. 2009). 
ISO Kmpski, 130 S. Ct at 2494. But see Burdine v. Kaiser, No. 3:09CVI026, 2010 WL 2606257, at *2 n.2 
(N.D. OhioJune 25, 20 I0) Qirniting KropsI;i to its facts, and so not to situations in which the plaintiff did not know 
the identity ofthe proper defendant, which under Sixth Circuit precedent is not a mistake). 
151 Kmpski, 130 S. Ct at 2494; sa; fog., Arthur v. Maersk, Inc., 434 F.3d 196,204 n.9 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing 
Garvin v. City of Philadelphia, 354 F.3d 215, 221-22 (3d Cir. 2003); 3 MOORE ET AL., supra note 95, 
~ 15.19[3)[d]). 
152 q: Kilkenny v. Arco Marine Inc., 800 F.2d 853,857 (9th Gir. 1986) ("[PJlaintifl's fuilure to amend its 
complaint to add a defendant after being notified ofa mistake ... may cause the unnamed party to conclude that 
it was not named because ofstrategic reasons ...."). 
153 See discussion supra Part IllA 
 
154 See supra text accompanying notes 53-58. 
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another defendant or defendants. However, he does not know that person's 
identity.155 As a result, if one reads the rule's mistake language and the 
Court's analysis in Krupski as requiring an error caused by a lack of 
understanding, it presents a superficially stronger linguistic argument than 
in the other situations discussed that no mistake is involved. The Court in 
Krupski is careful to use the error/mistake language in applying the rule, 
which suggests some support for this position. However, the Court also 
makes clear that the language is designed to protect against only strategic 
choices, not those that occur as a result of a lack of knowledge concerning 
the identity of the proper defendant. 156 If that prospective defendant has 
notice and knowledge that it would be a proper defendant but for a lack of 
factual understanding as to his identity, the prospective defendant would 
have the very windfall protection of the statute of limitations that the Court 
sought to prohibit in Krupski. 157 Such a reading is also consistent with the 
policy of the rule, which is to allow decisions on the merits as long as the 
policy of the statute of limitations is satisfied. 15s To read this language as a 
bar to John Doe amendments, while allowing relation back to changes of 
parties or the addition ofparties, would be inconsistent with the text and the 
purpose of the rule. 
The text of the rule sets the parameters that apply to changes to the 
party or the naming of the party. In the setting of an amendment that 
replaces a John Doe with the actual party, the amendment "changes the 
party," and so provides entry to the rule. The plaintiff must then show that 
the notice and knowledge components are met so that the new party is not 
prejudiced. 159 Consistent with Krupski, the "mistake" language is designed to 
insure that the rule may only be used when the plaintiff did not have an 
understanding of the prospective defendant's identity.16o If the prospective 
defendant knows this, it should not be given the windfall of the statute of 
limitations any more than a prospective defendant whose status or role was 
not fully understood. 161 
155 &e Goodman v. Praxair, Inc., 494 F.3d 458, 470-71 (4th Cir. 2007). This is the vel)' situation in Woo1, 
and it allowed courts to apply the rule in other situations. &e Wood v. Worachek, 618 F.2d 1225, 1230 (7th Gir. 
1980). 
156 &e Krupski, 130 S. Ct. at 2496. 
157 &eid. at 2494. 
158&e Goodman, 494 F.3d at 471; SingietaIyv. Pa Dep't ofCorr., 266 F.3d 186,201 n.5 (3d Gir. 2001);.fa! 
also supra text accompanying notes 15-20. 
159 Goodman, 494 F.3d at 470 CThe Rule's description ofwhen such an amendment relates back ... focuses 
on the notice I1J the MlJ fJar!Y and the d[l!£t 0/1 the MlJ fJar!Y that the amendment will have. These core requirements 
preserve for the new party the protections ofa statute oflimitations." (citation omitted)). 
IfIJ See id. at 471. 
161 Id CThe 'mistake'language is textually limited to describing the notice that the new party had, requiring 
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The important point is that the plaintiff has an opportunity to have his 
amended claim heard against the newly named party who has replaced the 
John Doe, but only if the plaintiff can show that the new defendant had the 
proper notice and knowledge that the rule requires. In this way, a proper 
balance is struck between the defendant's right to repose and the plaintiffs 
right to proceed with his claim. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In adopting amendments to the relation back provisions of Rule 15(c) in 
1966, the Advisory Committee sought to clarifY and liberalize the relation 
back of amendments, changing the party or the naming of the party, in light 
of the policy of encouraging decisions on the merits. However, the courts 
have often applied the rule in a narrow fashion that limits its utility as a tool 
to encourage decisions on the merits. Those courts focused on the mistake 
language in the rule and applied it only in cases of misnomers and 
misidentifications. In doing so, these courts seek to protect defendants' 
rights to repose without acknowledging the fact that those rights have to be 
balanced against plaintiffs' rights to have a case heard on the merits. In 
recent years, some courts have begun to expand the application of the rule 
to a far wider range of cases, which allows the rule to be used in a way that 
is consistent with the Advisory Committee's intent to encourage decisions 
on the merits. The tension created by these conflicting cases has been 
resolved by the Supreme Court's opinion in Krupski v. Costa Crociere s.p.A., 
which makes clear that courts should read the rule in a way that strikes a 
proper balance between the interests of the parties and thus avoid a crabbed 
reading of the rule that would limit its use to "a slip of the pen." 
that the new party have expected or should have expected, within the limitations period, that it would be named 
in the first place ...."). 
